Alterations by a Life Tenant or Tenant for Years as Waste by Homan, Frank C.
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
1967
Alterations by a Life Tenant or Tenant for Years as
Waste
Frank C. Homan
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Frank C. Homan, Alterations by a Life Tenant or Tenant for Years as Waste, 16 Clev.-Marshall L. Rev. 220 (1967)
Alterations By a Life Tenant or Tenant for Years
as Waste
Frank C. Homan*
T HE LAW OF WASTE began sometime around the twelfth century.
Protection of the succeeding owners of estates of inheritance against
improper acts by the person in possession of the land was, and is, the
essence of this action.' Generally it may be said that the person in pos-
session of land is required to use it in such a way as not to unreasonably
injure the interests in the land of one who has a future right of posses-
sion. Any failure to comply with this duty constitutes waste.2
In the thirteenth century the evolving common law saw the enact-
ment of two statutes involving waste. The first was the Statute of Marl-
bridge, enacted in 1267, 3 and followed in 1278 by the Statute of Glouces-
ter.4 Both statutes forbade the commission of waste and imposed severe
penalties on violators. However, nowhere in the text of either statute
is there a definition as to what conduct constitutes waste. This definition
and elaboration have been left to the judicial process.5 It is the distinc-
tion between permissible and impermissible conduct which has occupied
the courts in the intervening centuries.
At first, because land was described by reference to its physical ap-
pearance, any change in the character of the property was denoted as
waste.6 Today, the line of demarcation is not so clearly defined and, since
property is now largely described by metes and bounds, there is the
strong possibility that strict adherence to the old rule might retard the
normal development of land and impose economic hardships on one who
occupies either as a life tenant or as a tenant for years under a long-term
lease.7
Such a tenant frequently has serious problems when he attempts to
make alterations, or to remodel or replace existing structures. He could
well find himself tied onto an uneconomic structure and yet, because of
*Asst. Prof. of Law, Univ. of Tulsa, College of Law.
1 5 Powell, Real Property § 637 (1962); Schwartz, Future Interests & Estate Planning
§§ 2.10, 3.22 (1965); Walsh on Equity § 26 (1930).
2 2 Tiffany, Law of Real Property § 630 (1939).
3 52 Hen. M, c. 23 (1267).
4 6 Edw. I, c. 5 (1278).
5 Kircheway, Liability for Waste at Common Law, 8 Columbia L. Rev. 425 (1908).
For a general view, see, 2 Encyc. of Negligence, 1748-1755 (1962).
6 2 Burby, Real Property, 38 (2d ed., 1954), Stephenson v. National Bank, 42 Fla. 347,
109 So. 424 (1926).
7 Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., 104 Wis. 7, 79 N. W. 738 (1899); Crowe v. Wilson, 65
Ind. 497, 5 N. E. 427 (1886).
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the doctrine of waste, be unable to make the changes necessary to bring
about a more profitable return.
Life Tenant
The Restatement has recognized the problem insofar as the life ten-
ant is concerned, and urged that it is not waste for a life tenant to add
a new structure to the land when the addition would not lessen the mar-
ket value of the interest of the remainderman or the reversioner.8 The
landmark case on which this concept is based is Melms v. Pabst Brewing
Co.9 There the life tenant had a lot on which there was a large dwelling
house. As a result of the growth and development of the city the prop-
erty became surrounded by factories and railroad tracks. The structure
stood isolated about 25 feet above street level, and was absolutely unde-
sirable as a residence and unsuited for any use as a business property.
The life tenant removed the building and graded the lot to street level,
enhancing the value of the property. The reversioners, relying on the
common-law rule of waste, claimed that the changes were waste even
though they enhanced the value of the property.
The court noted that there was a complete and permanent change in
the surroundings that had deprived the realty of its value and usefulness.
Since there was no agreement binding the life tenant to restore the prop-
erty in the same condition in which he had received it, he was not guilty
of waste. The court did, however, issue a caveat that its decision was not
to be construed as permitting a tenant to make substantial changes in
the leasehold property or the buildings on it to suit his own whim or con-
venience simply because the change was in some way beneficial.
A few years later, there appeared a New York case involving the
same question, and the decision aroused a great deal of interest in real
property circles. It involved the rich parties, a life tenant, and replace-
ment of a structure that had outlived its usefulness. 10 A man named
Brokaw (a leader of New York society) had built four palatial homes in
New York City on the then fashionable part of Fifth Avenue. Three of
them were occupied by his children and the fourth, by his testamentary
devise, went to another child for life with contingent remainders in the
alternative to the other children. The life tenant found himself with a
white elephant on his hands. Even if he let the premises stand vacant
and unused, his annual expenses for taxes, maintenance, and upkeep
would have been $15,000 to $20,000 a year. Private residences of this
8 Restatement, Property, § 139-140; Comment e of § 140 (1936) is limited to life
estates, the authors seemingly unconcerned with landlord-tenant duties and liabili-
ties. However, much of it is analogous.
9 Supra, n. 7.
10 Brokaw v. Fairchild, 135 Misc. 70, 237 N. Y. S. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1929), aff'd. 231 App.
Div. 704, 245 N. Y. S. 402 (1930), Finch, J., dissenting; aff'd. without opinion, 177 N. E.
186 (1934); and see, note, 30 Mich. L. Rev. 784 (1932).
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type were no longer in vogue and the life tenant could not even find an-
other sub-tenant who would take it at $20,000 per year. So, the tenant
asked for a declaratory judgment to the effect that it was permissible for
him to replace the old home with a modern thirteen-story apartment
building which would have an income of about $70,000 a year. The court
rejected the application. Its reason was based on the law of waste, which
it declared was anything that did permanent injury to the freehold. It
felt that the law intended that the property should pass to the remainder-
men or reversioners as unimpaired in its nature, character and improve-
ments as was practicable.1
The prospect of valuable land in New York, especially on Fifth Ave-
nue, being relegated to such an uneconomic use, apparently stirred the
legislators, for as a direct consequence of the Brokaw decision a statute
was passed applicable to estates for life and for terms of not less than
five years. It provided, in effect, that if the replacement or alteration was
one which a prudent owner seized of an estate in fee simple absolute
would be likely to make in view of the surrounding circumstances, such
a change would be viewed as one that would not reduce the market
value of the future interests in the estate.
12
The broad terms of the statute leave it to the courts to determine,
under the "reasonable man rule," what alterations a life tenant or other
holder may make. Certainly such factors as the nature of the surround-
ing areas,13 character of the building,1 4 and the extent of the alterations, 15
may be considered. The one absolute requirement of the statute is that
there be no decrease in the market value. However, this means little
unless one thinks the legislators intended to employ statistical valuations
of life estates and remainders from mortality tables in order to provide
the criteria. This approach ignores cases in which the grantor expresses
an intention to allow the tenant to perform acts which would, under its
rule, be waste.' 6
It is suggested that it is more reasonable to adopt the view that the
life tenant is entitled to use the premises in accordance with the intention
of the parties creating the tenancy. Where no intention is expressed, a
reasonable use may be presumed.17
11 Brokaw v. Fairchild, supra, n. 10, pp. 14-15.
12 McKinney, Real Property Law, 537, subd. 2 (1937). See comments on the statute
in 38 Columbia L. Rev. 532 (1938); 7 Fordham L. Rev. 136 (1938).
13 Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., supra, n. 7.
14 Agate v. Lowenbein, 56 N. Y. 604 (1874).
15 Abel v. Wuestein, 143 Ky. 513, 136 S. W. 867 (1913) (radical alterations forbidden).
16 King v. Hawley, 248 P. 2d 491 (Cal. App. 1952): "power to consume or dispose of
property limited only by life tenant's good faith." For other applications of the
"good faith" rule, as applied to fiduciaries of estates, see also: In re Springett's
Estate, 25 Misc. 2d 68, 206 N. Y. S. 2d 48 ( Surr. Ct. 1960); In re Woolard's Estate,
295 N. Y. 390, 68 N. E. 2d 181 (1946); United States v. Lincoln Rochester Trust Co.,
297 F. 2d 891 (2d Cir 1962).
17 5 Amer, Law of Prop. (Casner, ed.) § 20.1 (1952).
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Tenant for Years
When a case involving waste arises, the courts should make a
distinction between short-term or tenancies at will and long-term or life
tenancies. So far as the tenant at will is concerned the landlord usually
has his protection in his right to terminate at will.'8 In fact, in one de-
cision that held a building alteration made by a short term lessee to be
waste, the court indicated the result might have been different had the
lease been for a long term.19 In the short term lease situation the tenant
is primarily interested only in obtaining temporary use of the facilities
found in any particular building. By contrast, the long term lessee, espe-
cially in cases of terms of 99 years,20 most frequently is interested in
obtaining control of a particular site and expects to erect his own build-
ing thereon. In addition to the burdens of improvement, the long-term
lessee often assumes payment of taxes and assessments. Thus, his pos-
session actually closely resembles that of an actual owner. To deny the
life tenant or the long-term tenant the right to replace obsolete improve-
ments, by holding such replacement to be waste, is to deny effect to what
must have been the intent of the grantor or lessor.
Meliorating Waste
In any event, it may be stated that acts can be waste even if they
enhance the value of the premises. This statement is such a contradiction
in terms that it has been treated as an anomaly in the law and is special-
ly described as "meliorating waste." 21 A typical example of this doc-
trine is found in a Florida case 22 wherein it was stated:
"Under the common law any alteration of the buildings on leased
premises by a tenant for years was waste, regardless of whether the
alteration was beneficial to the owner of the reversion. This is the law
in Florida today. .. ." Here the tenant under a five-year lease began
alterations by constructing interior partitions and making some large
openings on the exterior walls for the purpose of turning the property
into an "arcade building" for rental purposes. The court enjoined the
alterations.
Another striking example of this rule can be found in the Chicago
Auditorium Association v. Willing case.2 3 The plaintiff had taken a 198-
18 Means v. Cotton, 225 Mass. 313, 114 N. E. 361 (1916).
19 Klie v. Broock, 56 N. J. Eq. 18, 37 A. 469 (1897).
20 See Pryor, Ninety-Nine Year Leases and Fortunes Made Therein (1928) (for an
interesting account of the economic ramifications of such leases).
21 The terms "meliorating" and "ameliorating" are synonymous. 1 New Century
Dict. pp. 38, 1040 (1942).
22 Stephenson v. National Bank of Winter Haven, 92 Fla. 347, 109 So. 424, 425 (1926).
23 20 F. 2d 837 (7th Cir. 1927); and see, Niehuss, Alteration or Replacement of
Buildings by the Long-Term Lessee, 30 Mich. L. Rev. 386 (1932).
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year lease on several adjacent lots and had erected an auditorium
building on them. Changes resulting from the growth of the city had
made the building financially unproductive and the lessee wanted to re-
place it with a modern building adapted to the new needs of the locality.
Some of the lessors claimed that destruction of the building would be
waste and would entitle them to claim a forfeiture of the leases. The
underwriters who were to buy the bonds issued to finance the erection
of the new building refused to do so until the court construed the leases.
Although the question of the right of the lessee to remove the building
was not directly in issue, the court noted the strong equities in the les-
see's favor and indicated that a right to make such changes was to be
implied from the great length of the demised term.
The decision attracted much attention and resulted in a spate of
law review articles, all commenting favorably on the new spirit of
Equity.24 Alas, the hosannas were premature, for the decree was re-
versed by the United States Supreme Court,25 because the suit was in
effect a proceeding for a declaratory judgment which was not within the
jurisdiction of the federal courts. 26
A case which appeared to give encouragement to a lessee who want-
ed to make alterations in a structure came up in Illinois. 27 At the time of
the commencement of the suit the building in question was over 35 years
old and virtually worthless. The lessee, holding under a 99-year lease,
wanted to replace it with a new twelve-story structure costing in excess
of $2,000,000. The court permitted the lessee to make the improvements,
saying that to hold otherwise would be to deny to him the right to devote
the property to the highest and best use to which it would be suited.
However, it should be noted that this was a trust case, and the courts
usually are more readily willing to give aid and direction to the execu-
tion of trusts.2 8
Alterations
How general must changes be, or how extensive must the alterations
or remodeling be, before they will be considered to be actionable waste?
Where the lessees under a 10-year lease were taking down partitions,
moving doorways, and removing gas fixtures and chandeliers, and where
24 See, Note, Quieting Title-What Constitutes a Removable Cloud on Title, 41 Harv.
L. Rev. 104 (1927); Note, Quieting Title-Where the Alleged Cloud Is in the Plain-
tiff's Lease, 76 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 217 (1927); Note, Quieting Title--Cloud on Title,
1 Cinc. L. Rev. 488 (1927).
25 277 U. S. 274, 48 S. Ct. 507 (1928).
26 For a criticism of the Supreme Court's decision, see Comment, 23 Ill. L. Rev. 595
(1929).
27 Northern Trust Co. v. Thompson, 336 Ill. 137, 168 N. E. 116 (1929).
28 Ibid. And see, In re Freeman's Estate, 181 Pa. St. 405, 37 A. 591 (1897); cf. Davis
v. Skipper, 125 Tex. 364, 83 S. W. 2d 318 (1935), holding that a contingent remainder-
man generally may not bring an action for waste against a holder of a qualified or
defeasible fee.
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the lease provided that the lessees might make any inside alterations
they thought proper, this was still considered to be waste. The court said
the power to make alterations did not arise out of the mere right of user.
The lease conferred only the right to the use of, and not the dominion
over, the property. If the tenant exercises an act of ownership, then he
is no longer protected by his tenancy.29 However, more recently, in a
case in New York, the lessee was a supermarket company. In order to
utilize the structure more practically, the tenant made extensive changes.
The lease required that no alterations be made without the landlord's
consent. Nevertheless, the changes were held not to be waste, as no
structural changes were made and the building could easily be restored
to its original condition. 0
The argument could certainly have been made in this case that the
intent of the parties, in a lease of a building to a supermarket company,
must have been that alterations could be made in order to effectively
adapt the premises for use as a supermarket. Clearly, the intention of
the parties at the time of the creation of the interests involved is the
controlling one. Where such intention is clear, it should be given effect
unless there is some strong overriding public policy involved. It would
seem obvious to any reasonable man that if premises are leased for a
specific purpose and are not entirely adapted to that purpose, then alter-
ations clearly will have to be made, and specific permission of the land-
lord is irrelevant.
However, the reluctance of the courts to break away from the mate-
rial alteration concept is illustrated by a Michigan case, where the tenant
wanted to tear out a store front and put in a new one, made principally
of tile, and also to put granolithic floors throughout and tile the walls and
ceilings. There would be no question that the value of the premises was
to be greatly enhanced. But the court refused to let the tenant proceed.
It held that a tenant could not make changes in the demised premises to
suit his own taste and convenience. Any material change in the premises
made by a tenant, even if it enhanced the value of the property, would
be waste.31
An Alabama case saw the tenant removing partitions and cutting
doorways to connect with an adjoining building. Even though there was
a covenant in the lease permitting alterations, the court felt that the
tenant could not, properly, so materially change the character of the
29 Agate v. Lowenbein, 57 N. Y. 604 (1874).
30 Nadeline Inc. v. Spear & Company, 20 Misc. 2d 559, 195 N. Y. S. 2d 453 (Sup. Ct.
1959).
31 Pearson v. Sullivan, 209 Mich. 306, 176 N. W. 597 (1920); Annot., 9 A. L. R. 445
(1920).
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building and that such changes constituted waste, even if the property's
value was enhanced.3
2
Where the tenant was ordered by the city building department to
make the premises safe by repairing a wall, and undertook to alter the
premises into a store, he was enjoined from so doing. Such radical
changes in the character and nature of the leased building, even though
the value was enhanced, would be waste.33
However, a different viewpoint was expressed in a relatively recent
Mississippi case. Here the tenant, under a ten-year lease with an option
to renew for an additional fifteen years, partitioned off half the building,
converted half into offices, and removed part of a glass front, thus trans-
forming it into a different kind of building. The court recognized that
mere enhancement of value does not bar an action for waste if the
changes are material and substantial. However, in view of the nature
of the lease term it must have been within the contemplation of the
parties that changes or rearrangements of lease space could and would
be made. Also, the changes were temporary. The court apparently
adopted the concept that the intent of the parties should be the governing
factor, and not just the bare fact of making of changes in the structure.34
Also following this line of reasoning was a case where the premises
were leased to a supermarket corporation for thirty-three years. The
lease provided that the lessee might make such changes in the premises
as would be desirable for its use. The tenant sublet to a motor-sales
and repair garage firm, which cut a 14-foot door in the front of the build-
ing. The court held that the terms of the lease permitted this, and that
such an act was not waste.35
There was an interesting Ohio case, some years ago, which involved
a golf course. While no structures were changed, the premises were
altered considerably. Here the lessees entered into a lease of 45 acres
for a term of 25 years, with an option to renew for an additional 10 years,
in order to develop a golf course. The lessees wanted to convert a near-
by pond into an artificial lake, and decided to cut a channel through to
nearby Lake Erie, so that pleasure boats could pass back and forth. The
court enjoined the defendants from interfering with the lessee's plans
and held that the changes were clearly within the contemplation of the
parties, and that whatever was reasonably required to develop the prop-
erty for the designated use was permissible. As the changes would not
32 F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Nelson, 204 Ala. 172, 85 So. 449 (1920); Annot., 13 A. L. R.
824 (1921).
33 McDonald v. O'Hara, 117 Misc. 517, 192 N. Y. S. 545 (Sup. Ct. 1921).
34 Sparkman v. Hardy, 223 Miss. 452, 78 So. 2d 584 (1955).
35 Turman v. Safeway Stores, 32 Mont. 285, 317 P. 2d 302 (1957); cf. Hamburger and
Dreyling v. Settgast, 62 Tex. Civ. App. 446, 131 S. W. 639 (1910).
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result in injury to the property, but would, instead, improve it, the court
would not interfere.
3 6
Erecting Buildings
There are few cases involving the question whether erecting addi-
tional buildings is waste. The earliest appears to be a New York case
which involved erecting a livery stable on a vacant part of the land. It
was not considered to be waste, provided that it could be done without
destroying or materially injuring the other buildings and improve-
ments.
3 7
A rather unusual, similar case involved a building in Chicago which
was erected by the lessee. Later the lease was assigned by the lessee to
a railroad company, which proceeded to cut off a corner of the building
in order to run elevated tracks through the cleared space. The lessor
brought an action for waste. The court held for the plaintiff, stating that
title to the building had vested at once in the lessor. The court noted the
fact that the property, as improved with the building, was better security
for rent. But it said that the improvement of one part does not carry
with it a right to destroy another part.
38
However, the more modern view is to look to the intent of the par-
ties. Lessors and a bank, in another case, entered into a 95-year lease for
a tract of land in downtown Dallas, Texas. The contract permitted the
bank to construct part of a building on the premises. The bank wanted
to connect that part of the building to another part on adjoining land.
The lessors contended that the joining was common-law waste. But the
court felt that if the lease permitted the lessee to build only a part of a
building on the leased premises there was an inference that it could be
connected with another part of a building on the adjoining lot.39 It
should be noted that the court did not overrule the old common-law of
waste, but merely said that the contract gave the right to make the con-
nection. Yet, this is clearly an example of the view that the intent of the
parties, and not their acts, will govern.
Fixtures
The courts seem to be taking a more liberal and realistic view as to
the tenant's use and enjoyment of the premises, as long as the landlord
suffers no real or actual loss. This is demonstrated by a number of cases
involving fixtures. Specifically, where a lessee placed a 40-foot-high
electric sign on the roof, and the lease restricted the premises to certain
36 J. H. Bellows Co. v. Covell, 28 Ohio App. 277, 162 N. E. 621 (1927).
37 Winship v. Paige, 3 Paige 259 (N. Y. 1838).
38 Bass v. Metropolitan West Side El. R. R. Co., 82 F. 857 (2d Cir. 1897).
39 Minzer v. First National Bank in Dallas, 390 S. W. 2d (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
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types of business uses, the court ruled that because the lease described
the premises by metes and bounds the lessee acquird the right, as an in-
cident of the lease, to place appropriate signs thereon, and that the act
was not waste. 40 The courts have also found for a tenant who removed
the landlord's sink and stove from an apartment, placed them in the base-
ment, and replaced them with the lessee's own sink and stove. The court
held that there had not been a violation of a restriction against altera-
tions without consent of the landlord.41 Also, where a tenant removed
his landlord's refrigerator and replaced it with his own without the land-
lord's consent, the court held that the substitution did not constitute an
"alteration" nor such a material change in the nature of the property as
to constitute waste; 42 nor was the installation of three air conditioners,
each weighing 750 pounds, by a lessee of a restaurant, considered to be
a material alteration.4  Another situation involved a tenant who had
maintained a movable washing machine for 4 years. When the landlord
learned of it he started eviction proceedings on the theory that it might
possibly cause damage or compel him to undergo great expense in
"modernizing" the facilities. The court rejected this contention as too
theoretical, and went on to say that the tenant could occupy and use
the premises in any lawful manner, so long as he did not injure the in-
heritance or commit waste.
44
Thus, it can be seen that the courts are beginning to adopt a more
flexible approach to the law of waste and that the old rules are now
largely a matter of history.
Remedies
Several states have considered the Statutes of Marlbridge and
Gloucester to be part of the common law received from England and,
in those states, the remedies of forfeiture and treble damages are avail-
able in an action for waste.45 Following are some samples of the rem-
edies available in some of the various jurisdictions:
In Kentucky, by both statute and judicial decision, treble damages
and forfeiture are the remedies for waste.
46
40 Lyon v. Bethlehem Engineering Corporation, 253 N. Y. 111, 170 N. E. 518 (1930).
41 Lansis v. Miklinsky, 10 App. Div. 2d 649, 198 N. Y. S. 2d 247 (1960).
42 Parker v. Johnson, 26 Misc. 2d 31, 206 N. Y. S. 2d 594 (1960).
43 Leong Won v. Snyder, 94 N. Y. S. 2d 247 (1949).
44 A. & B. Cabrini Realty Co. v. Newman, 237 N. Y. S. 2d 970 (1963); see also Sigsbee
Holding Co. v. Vanavan, 240 N. Y. S. 2d 900 (1963) (replacing cabinets); Buchfuhrer
v. Tantleff, 112 N. Y. S. 2d 69 (1952) (installation of a T.V. antenna); but see, Patton
v. U. S., 139 F. Supp. 279 (D. C. Pa. 1955) (failure to replace fixtures was waste).
45 Restatement, Property § 198 (1936) (takes the position that the statutes were not
part of the common law received by the several states; Simes and Smith, Law of
Future Interests § 1658 (1956).
46 Ky. Rev. Stat. § 381.350 (1932); Continental Fuel Co. v. Hadden, 182 Ky. 8, 206
S. W. 8 (1918).
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Georgia's code provides for forfeiture of the estate, 47 but by inter-
pretation this has been limited to wanton commissive waste.4 8
Idaho permits recovery of treble damages, by statute, but by inter-
pretation there also must be wanton and malicious waste.49
An earlier statute in Washington was construed to allow treble dam-
ages where the waste was wanton and wilful.50 This statute was then
amended to require assessment of treble damages whether the waste was
wilful or not.51
Arkansas has held that the Statute of Gloucester is not part of the
common law of that state, so there is no forfeiture. But a remainderman
may have a receiver appointed in cases of waste. 52
Idaho also has held that the Statute of Gloucester is not part of its
common law so far as forfeiture is concerned, but does permit treble
damages.53
A decision refused to allow treble damages or forfeiture in Illinois.
The court said that treble damages had never existed as remedies for
waste in that state.54
A recent New York case held that a tenant who makes alterations
with the tacit consent of his landlord is under no obligation to restore
the premises to their original condition at the end of the term.55
Of course, the above citations are not to be taken as a comprehensive
survey of the whole country, as far as the remedies of forfeiture and
treble damages are concerned. But they are fairly typical.
In any event, as in other fields of law, the available legal remedies
for waste have fallen short of providing substantial justice. As a result,
Equity has been used as a means of providing supplementary remedies.
One method has been the declaratory judgment, but this has met with
only limited success. 56
47 Ga. Code Ann. § 85-604 (1945).
48 Wright v. Connor, 200 Ga. 413, 37 S. E. 2d 353 (1946).
49 Idaho Code Ann. § 658.1 (1938); Pearson v. Harper, 87 Ida. 245, 392 P. 2d 687
(1964).
50 Delano v. Tennant, 138 Wash. 39, 244 P. 273 (1926).
51 Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 938 (Supp. 1943); Grafell v. Honeysuckle, 30 Wash. 2d
390, 191 P. 2d 858 (1948).
52 Smith v. Smith, 219 Ark. 304, 241 S. W. 2d 113 (1951).
53 Idaho Code Ann. § 658.1 (1938); Worthington Motors v. Crouse, 80 Nev. 147, 390 P.
2d 229 (1964).
54 Wise v. Potomac Nat. Bank, 393 Ill. 357, 65 N. E. 2d 767 (1946).
55 Petrelli v. Kagel, 37 Misc. 2d 246, 235 N. Y. S. 2d 383 (1962).
56 Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 277 U. S. 274, 48 S. Ct. 507 (1928), holding
that mere informal disagreement as to lessee's right to tear down building and con-
struct a new one, absent an attempt by lessor to prevent such action, does not confer
equity jurisdiction on the federal courts; Washington Detroit Theatre Co. v. Moore,
249 Mich. 673, 229 N. W. 618 (1930). A brief discussion of the use of declaratory
judgments in waste cases may be found in Niehuss, Alterations or Replacement of
Buildings by the Long-Term Lessee, supra n. 23.
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The general rule seems to be that tenants for life or for years in
threatened waste cases are subject to injunction. 57 As to monetary dam-
ages, it has been held that depreciation in value of the property due to
acts of waste is not the correct measure of damages, but rather the
measure is the cost of repairing the property or restoring it to the
original condition.5"
Conclusion
It would seem best to recognize that the old rule of waste, which
was based on practically any physical change in the premises, is dead.
The rule today would clearly seem to be that, to determine waste, one
must decide whether or not the acts complained of violated the actual or
presumed intention of the parties creating the estate. Certainly the least
desirable approach to a determination of what is actionable waste is that
which attaches liability to certain acts regardless of their desirability or
practical context. It seems to be the rule today that the intention of the
parties, or, the "reasonable man rule" should govern.
57 Baltimore & P. S. Co. v. Ministers, etc. Starr M. P. Church, 148 Md. 390, 130 A. 46
(1925); Jennings v. Elliott, 186 Okla. 285, 97 P. 2d 67 (1939); McClintock on Equity
§ 132 (2d ed. 1948); Walsh, op. cit. supra, n. 1.
58 Miller v. Belknap, 75 Ida. 46, 266 P. 2d 662 (1954); Stone Mountain Industries, Inc.
v. Bennett, 112 Ga. App. 480, 145 S. E. 2d 591 (1965); Savin v. Gholson, 51 Ohio App.
443, 1 N. E. 2d 646 (1935).
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